With regard to the end of the Cambodian Civil War, or ragtag struggle for “national liberation” for any Marxist-Leninist-Whateverists who may be reading, for years many have still mistakenly associated certain people captured on film during the fall of Phnom Penh, displaying a symbol of distinctive design, with the Khmer Rouge. After a dry-season offensive which began on January 1 1975, finally on a Glorious April 17, their silent armies sullenly marched in Indian File, or rolled, into Cambodia’s capital city, on captured American-made military vehicles. On that morning of defeat for the Khmer Republic, to weary but cheering crowds black-clad soldiers (looking too clean-cut to have been out on the battlefield) confidently made their way through the city’s streets, riding atop trucks and jeeps, waving a flag. A red and blue flag, the colours split equally and diagonally from top right to bottom left. Superimposed upon this background there was what looked to be a white cross. It was not, however, representative of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, itself hiding behind a dead letter united front. It was the banner of another small and not well-known organisation, hatched from a desperate plan cooked up by some inside the Khmer Republic’s top civil service. The Monatio or National Movement (Mouvement National) was a pathetic attempt by members of the country’s soon-to-be defunct elite, to present themselves as friends to a tattered but heavily-armed foe, who were every bit determined that it would be they, and they alone who would dictate the peace.
The reader may be aware of a particular image reproduced here, the shot of an angry-looking young man in black garb, brandishing a pistol and threatening someone out of sight. A Khmer Rouge solider in a bit of a bad mood? Or perhaps he is Hem Keth Dara, the son of Khmer Republic official Hem Keth Sana, although elsewhere he has been identified as a FANK general. Dara, whatever he looked like and whatever daddy really was, led this group of poseurs and manipulated saps, in turn directed from on high by former classmates of some in the GRUNK leadership, and who had found themselves in a bit of a pickle, being on the losing side of a bitter armed conflict. Those among them, included Lon Nol’s younger brother, Lon Non. Lon Nol himself had scarpered by that time, first to Indonesia then onto Hawaii. Not forgetting, of course, after helping himself to a draft for one million US dollars from the country’s National Bank. The bank building would soon be detonated by explosives, a Khmer Rouge cliché and act of iconoclasm. On that fateful day, by early afternoon in the midst of confusion, the stooge Dara and his chums managed to make use of the city’s radio station, seized by them during their antics in the morning. In a pre-recorded message broadcast to its inhabitants, his taped voice announced that the “National Movement” welcomed the incoming troops, proposing that a nice chat should be had on the details of surrender. Then the real Khmer Rouge broke in, unimpressed, announcing: “We are not here to negotiate! We are entering the city by force of arms.”
Ragged and thin KR zonal troops had entered the city from different directions, with school teacher turned military commander Koy Thuon’s forces among them, setting up base at the Hotel Monorom, seen to the right, in the Claude Juvenal photo at the top. There, they organised a committee for the ‘wiping out’ of enemies, to sort out the identification and execution of high-level personnel of the Lon Nol civil and military administrations. On the subject of terror, Thuon would be among the earliest to go during the Communist Party’s centralisation drive (with accompanying internal purges) in the Democratic Kampuchea period. His 1976 departure was from a region of the country which throughout the regime could not provide a surplus of rice for the central government’s development needs. Increased pressure made a difficult task much worse with the second forced migration of labouring people, driven by the KR from the South West (the Pot-Mok powerbase) northwards. He drew the short straw when it came to the Party’s regional secretaryship, the North being one of the least hospitable and undeveloped zones. Back on topic though, Lon Non was not spared; along with the likes of Sirik Matak and Long Boret dying in undecided circumstances, at least some bits of him were probably spattered across a lawn of the smart, exclusive country club, the Circle Sportif. The Monatio students on the streets were broken up and disarmed, these fakers neither seen as friends or much of a threat in acting out this piece of tragicomic relief during the final collapse of the Republic. This small example of folly showing just how out of touch with reality some had become, even beyond the earlier “Third Force” position of finding a not-so bloody settlement to the fighting. The Khmer Rouge after 1973 in particular weren’t going to give up on a sure thing.
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Dara certainly made an impression on English hack Jon Swain, who recalled that his black pyjamas looked like they’d been tailored by “Yves Saint Laurent”. What Lon Non must have been thinking when organising all this is anyone’s guess.
Yes, this was commented on by Philip Short in his biography of Pol Pot. As for Lon Non and his mates, they must have felt some degree of uncertainty as to their well-being close to surrendering. Before Dara’s brief radio announcement, The KR had used a mobile radio station set up on the outskirts of Phnom Penh, to broadcast to its inhabitants details of their imminent entry into the city, but according to Short, hardly anyone noticed it. Also, many people, including those fighting on the same side knew little of how the Communist’s politics had developed since the early 1970s, other than assumptions of their harshness being a result of the exigencies of the war. Refugees who had fled from the fighting and the increasingly coercive changes occurring in the liberated areas, gave accounts of life in these places; but many still thought that after the war things would resume as normal, minus the repression of the Sihanouk era and the corruption of the Lon Nol government. Some of the politically literate urban people would have included those with hopes of at least some approximation of a social democratic direction the country could travel in.
People inside the rural areas and the towns had supported the FUNK for patriotic or nationalist reasons, not knowing that the Communists had thoroughly out-manoeuvred the Sihanouk-supporters early on in the life of this front organisation, and its accompanying GRUNK government, or much of real substance about them at all. Only that an organisation, members of which were slagged off and bullied by Sihanouk in the late 1960s had allied itself with the man and his coterie, and were providing most of the fighting muscle. People who knew of them, were perhaps confident things would be okay, because of the involvement of three leftist former National Assembly officials: Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon and Hu Nim. They were known to be part of this group after fleeing earlier government repression. Holding government portfolios, they had enjoyed some considerable popular admiration and support, due to their genuine concerns and work for their poor constituents, against the ills of Sihanouk’s Sangkum.
It just goes to show how little most Western commentators (with the exception of a couple of specialists) really know about internal Cambodian politics in this period. There were some very odd alliances between former socialists (or at least ‘leftists’) like Hang Thun Hak and Penn Yuth, some of whom even joined the laughable ‘Socio-Republican Party’. Perhaps they were just making the best of the duff hand they’d been dealt, or perhaps they really believed they could achieve something.
It’s interesting to speculate on what the average educated resident of Phnom Penh might have believed about what was likely to happen; I always found James Fenton’s description of his ex-Khmer Rouge associate who “seemed to have just remembered” something as a fair indication.
But as you said, no-one knew very much about the Angkar – not even the non-CPK members of the GRUNK.
Yes, the proposed “third force” I referred to earlier, an attempt at trying to enable a line of communication (and perhaps compromise) with Sihanouk, by high-level civil servants who regarded themselves as neutralists in the Lon Nol government; although here it is viewed as a ruse by the Chinese, to bide time.
Several of these neutralists, however, later fled the country and in exile helped organise the non-Communist resistance. Important among these was Son Sann, who later headed the volatile alliance between disparate and squabbling Republican and Sihanoukist armed groups, who had carried on the fight against the KR from the borderlands after 1975. They joined together against the occupying Vietnamese under the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front.
And then of course the volatility reached another level in the alliance formed between the above and the deposed DK administration, and a sizeable regrouped chunk of its army.
Where has the translation of Pol Pot’s 1977 speech disappeared to?
The Liberator Press issue? It’ll reappear. I’m tidying it up first, as well as other articles, and then converting them into PDF format for this blog. I’ll post it up eventually.
I note Dara appears in the film footage about 26 seconds in.
Hem Keth Sana was a former provincial governor and the Republic’s Minister of the Interior & Religion, based on the few references I can find. Of course he may well have been a general as well – I think many senior-grade civil servants were simply handed out commissions in 1953/4, and the PSR was infested with FANK officers as I’m sure you know.
If it is actually Dara, then he does indeed appear in the video. Thanks for the info with regard to clearing up the possible position or positions held by his father, although it is interesting what you say about the 1950s. I guess you are referring to what happened after the conference at Geneva, negotiating the end of the First Indochina War.
In the Sihanouk era people who had traditionally been represented in the conservative provincial and urban elite, whether commercial or military, became angered by, among other things, the lack of an increased foreign inflow of western money, but were kept off balance rather than nakedly repressed, like the left. While the nationalisation of certain sectors of industry looked “socialist” on the surface, it was merely an easier way of ensuring the personal enrichment of those close to Sihanouk, particularly the clique surrounding his wife Monique. The army, too, was angered that during the 1960s, Phnom Penh had lost effective administrative control of some areas of the country, whether it be to the Vietnamese or home-grown maquisards. This was part of a wider situation which was out of Sihanouk’s control, not least the escalation of war in the country next door. During the Khmer Republic’s brief and shrinking life, the fake pluralism of the 1972 elections would have been attractive to these kinds of people. It is too tangled I know, but if the disruption in the region caused through the competition of two rival world blocs had not reached Cambodia as it did, and Sihanouk had not frustrated the rightist elements of the same elite, then it perhaps would have been the same trough, just more room made for a different set of pigs to put their snouts in. Maybe in the 1960s it was possible that a KR insurgency could have been contained; an irritation, but no serious threat. After all, armed rebels have been a perennial problem, whether they be apolitical bandits, or people like the Thanhists. Sihanouk losing a grip on his alienated rivals, the coup and the bombing changed that of course.
Yes, as I’ve read it -unfortunately, I can’t remember where, right now – Sihanouk needed to create FARK pretty quickly after the French transferred power (indeed, the French military stayed on after the settlement, though Sihanouk covered this fact up to his neighbours). In order to create an instant officer class, a large number of civil servants were put on training courses and given commissions – including people like Sirik Matak and (I think, although I’m not certain in the latter case) In Tam.
This is, of course, part of the reason that, in later years, many FANK officers were spectacularly inept, or (as in the case of Tam) loathed by much of the army of which they were a part. It also helps to explain (beyond the influence of Lon Nol, anyway) the semi-military character of the Khmer Republic; the line between public servant and soldier was rather blurred. The presence of military ’socialists’ like Keo Meas’s old mate Penn Yuth blurred it still further.
And yes, I agree with the rest of your assessment above.
Ineptness could also be matched by spectacular bravery. There were the likes of Norodom Chantaraingsey among the better FANK generals, adored by his men. A veteran of the anti-French struggle, he renounced his princely title in 1970, and led resistance after the Communist victory. Among many officers that rightly feared immediate execution upon surrender, he decided to continue fighting on, after first fleeing to the Cardamom mountains. According to Justin Corfield in his short history of the non-Communist resistance, his FANK 13th Brigade consisted of up to two thousand men, and fought the KR up to as late as 1977, making daring raids. James Fenton, who you referred to in an earlier comment, wrote a poem about his surreal battlefield dinner date with Chantaraingsey in 1973, called Dead Soldiers.
The ineptness of the FANK can also be explained by the state of the army’s lack of standardisation. In his account of the war Sak Sutsakhan had complained that the KR were generally using Soviet and Chinese weaponry and equipment, or similar from Socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, making it relatively easy for them to train their forces in whichever part of the country they operated. Aside from what was captured or even bought from corrupt FANK officers. In contrast the FANK had a mishmash of old French, newer Russian and then American equipment; a result of Cambodia’s receipt of aid from shifting international donors: firstly due to Sihanouk’s leftward foreign policy and then the rightward direction of the Khmer Republic. This meant delays in sending troops to other parts of the country when losses demanded their transfer. The time needed to train solders trained in one type, in the use of another. Or similarly if equipment was lost or destroyed, then units received new supplies they weren’t trained to use, or weren’t compatible with what they had already.
You’re right about the absurdity of the FANK in general during the war, and with regard to that Lon Nol’s Neo-Khmerisme, with its superstitions, talismans and marijuana. According to Philip Short, he even ordered soldiers to draw a line of supposedly magical and coloured sand around the perimeter of the capital city, to help ward off the Khmer Rouge armies. It seems there had been little thought given to the dependence on US air strike power helping to swell the enemy’s ranks.
Keo Meas had a very good “Communist” background within a Cambodian context, and although being close to Pol’s age had been tipped as a future leader. As well as involvement in the underground he headed the Pracheachon in the interests of Khmer Viet Minh veterans left without much protection following Geneva, unlike the Viet Minh and Pathet Lao. Of course the sham democracy of the Sihanouk era meant the Pracheachon’s banner became increasingly tattered. Penn Yuth had been present at the founding of the KPRP, if I remember correctly, and was involved in the above and legal “party of the plough.”
You not at uni yet?
I’m not going unfortunately. I just wouldn’t be able to afford it, and a change in circumstances means I have to work full-time now anyway, so …
I understand but you could at least try and find some other way. It is much more difficult for those on low incomes, where you don’t have the help you would have if unemployed and on benefits. I guess voluntary unemployment as a path into academia is not an option with the little one. Shite and unfair. You going back over there soon tho?
Yes, but further afield. Call centres in Moscow don’t provide the most satisfying of jobs or reasonable pay. As for the other stuff, yeah I had some clueless middle class prannet suggest that I should think about becoming unemployed. Of course, a great idea. Sees it as a lark or game. I don’t have a degree in Russian by the way, so with no formal acknowledgement, I am unqualified to speak it. But I do sometimes, on the sly, with my tongue in my cheek. I know who you are too.
I can still hope:
wink
Well with your family circumstances I agree. It’s always underneath eh? Middle class idiots, out of touch.
Isn’t that the truth.
Where’s Ib? Has he/she not made any more visits?
snigger
Ha, fuck off you Moscow “Patrice Lumumba University” undergrad wannabe.
You bad mannered so and so.
I’m still around, just waiting for the next instalment.
I know I’m new here so please pardon me asking: Pineapple Are you actually in Moscow and actually speak Russian?
I am Russian and I got highly surprised! And to repeat what I just said in another comment, thanks for your blog!
I am English, but visit Russia when money and time allows. When it comes to the language, I could be what is loosely termed a dilettante. I want/need to learn it properly. As for your recent comment about the 1978 Yugoslav documentary, I am not aware of the full film being available on-line, nor have I been able to obtain a copy from elsewhere. But, footage from it has been used in other programmes and documentaries. A French television programme from the late 1970s discusses the Yugoslav film, uses plenty of footage, and a small piece of it can be viewed at the French national archives website, click here. However, to view the whole thing a purchase has to be made in order to download a protected copy. You can see about three and half minutes for free.
Thanks for the response! I can’t believe I found it (well, you found it). Well now I’m officially glad that I still remember some French
.
No problem, although I think you’re ahead of me in the language department.
If you want to view the whole French television programme on the Yugoslav film Kampuchea 1978, then I am happy to help you out and share. Firstly you need to download the free DivX player, then download this file. Note the video will only play in the DivX player, and only when on-line. If this doesn’t work, then I don’t how else I can be of help.
Thanks! I actually already paid for this on Friday though downloading it only now. It was my birthday this week-end so I figured I can spend 4 euros as a present to myself
. I am not familiar how exactly it’s going to work (since I never dealt with .tix files before) but hope that I will actually get the file on my computer.
SuperJohnny you can check my blog in Russian, though it’s not entirely about DK it is based mainly on Kampuchea and related experiences.
There might be some part of this Cambodge 78 movie on YouTube it seems, there’s earlier French newprograms some from Lon Nol times. A user cppcanada has lots of those. I’m yet to watch all of this, I understand French very little, I hate Frenchmen in fact, but so many information on Cambodia in French and in French exclusively that I started to learn French.
Regarding the picture. Where is it? It’s on Monivong boulevard near the intersection with Kampuchea Krom street. Oh, old days I miss you!
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