I think you’re correct in laying the blame for some of the ‘transformation’ in the Party during this period at Sihanouk’s feet. The Sangkum was, after all, prominently styled as ‘socialist’, even if there was objectively little or no socialism in it, and Sihanouk freely borrowed from policies suggested by Hou Yuon and Khieu Samphan as and when it suited him, not to mention his post-63 flirtation with China and North Vietnam. This could only have pushed those in the maquis towards something rather more radical. If Sihanouk had dealt honestly with those willing to work with him – Hou Yuon and Hu Nim, and perhaps Samphan as well in that period,as well as the few remaining urban leftists – things might have developed differently. But he was never going to deal honourably with men that he knew would ultimately desire his removal.

Until 1970, at least, when he had nothing left to lose.

It is interesting, the subject of influences and to what extent these had on shaping the CPK’s political outlook, as difficult as it is, piecing the jigsaw puzzle together. The secrecy of the Khmer Communists, it could be said, was partly due to a pattern of behaviour developed out of necessity for survival in a country that had a government (Sihanouk’s) which tolerated no decent opposition, whether from the left or right, the real political change under these circumstances occurring in the shifting balance of an inter-related elite. Also, that bete noire of the Khmer Communists: The Vietnamese and their competing objectives. After all the Communist Party which the Pol Potists later tried to thoroughly dominate evolved from the Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party, which was founded with Vietnamese guidance during the First Indochina War, in 1951, along with the legal organisation the People’s Group or Pracheachon in 1955. They would later try to retrospectively cleanse the history of the Cambodian movement of any Vietnamese involvement, reshaping it as a pure Khmer creation. Other than chauvinist sentiments which can be present among people no matter the politics involved, and aside from intellectuals feeling resentful at being treated as inferiors or, at worst, children by their condescending “brothers,” there was a sense of Vietnamese treachery, leaving the Khmers exposed to repression and worse inside their own country. In earlier times following less than favourable terms agreed at the Geneva talks in 1954. And later, when the Khmer Rouge insurgency began in the late 1960s against Sihanouk’s faltering Sangkum. The Vietnamese were at first reluctant to offer military aid to the rebels, as for one thing Sihanouk had been most helpful with regard to their own war objectives in the South, especially with large-scale American involvement to contend with. Into the 1970s, and after the Christmas Bombings over North Vietnam, the Paris Agreements which followed released US airstrike power for use over Cambodia, then by 1973 at war with itself. The Vietnamese temporarily cut off supplies to the Khmer Rouge, down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. An act to help persuade (or rather force) the Khmers to come to the negotiating table too. Difficulty in keeping their guns oiled and loaded, while yet more bombs were laying waste to the countryside didn’t help relations between the two groups of Communists.

The Burgler book you commented on in another post of mine has some interesting information on how the Khmers and Vietnamese not only fought side by side, but against one another during the civil war. Ad hoc agreements that saw Khmer Rouge and Lon Nol soldiers collude in the killing of Vietnamese, whether they be from South Vietnam, to support the Lon Nol government, or the Communists aiding to a great extent the Khmer Rouge with their superior skills. Joining their enemies and turning their guns on their foreign allies seemingly shows that shared ethnicity or some sense of patriotism to their respective countries was more important than the politics of others they were fighting over. And which many didn’t really understand themselves. Such things as the above are generalisations, though, from a layperson like me.

Hu Nim was from a poor peasant background, but due to being naturally gifted and very bright had been fortunate enough to leave his circumstances and receive a good education. He was one of the three National Assembly deputies (along with Khieu Samphan and Hou Youn) who were, among the left-leaning educational milieu in the capital, attracted by the idea of “mass democracy ” coming from the Cultural Revolution in China. The CR had little real influence on the Cambodian Revolution, however, and his peasant background didn’t save him. He was a popular and admired activist before leaving for the maquis, having genuine concern for his poor constituents. It is still a matter of debate, admittedly out of my depth of understanding, as to just how things mutated during those years into something so extreme and toxic, manifesting itself in the DK regime. There are beardy academics for that kind of thing.

The Vietnamese were much much better than the KR (they were ragtag in comparison), but the latter still had often young and fanatical troops, noted for their bravery, and near-suicidal battlefield acrobatics. When the North Vietnamese and their allies in the South won the war, they were able to seize American weaponry and equipment not withdrawn or destroyed when the US military left, so they were even more well-equipped. Most devastation of the RAK during the 1978 Vietnamese invasion occurred where Ta Mok and Son Sen’s forces were located, and put up stiff resistance. I believe that the Chinese had advised the DK government not to opt for creating a defensive line to repel a future Vietnamese attack, and instead adopt mobile guerilla tactics. This may have had something to do with the Chinese taking a dim view of the ability of the RAK, with being frustrated by the quality of the troops their own military advisers were helping to train. Aside from their willingness to fight, they were, as usual for the Pol Potists, recruited and promoted because of their background rather than aptitude. Coming from poor peasant backgrounds, a fair few simply lacked even basic education (literacy etc) or skills to operate more modern, sophisticated weaponry brought in from China. Tanks and the like. There is an incident, not sure if it is true or not, where an aggravated Pol Pot said to Chinese advisers the Khmer people had no need for “iron water buffaloes.” As well as this though, the Cambodian Civil War had been, much more than the Vietnamese conflict, a conventional war with clearly marked fronts from which both sides battled. However, in that conflict the KR were up against the hopeless FANK.

Another thing to consider is the centralisation drive of the Communist Party and the weaknesses of the military (warlordism, rivalry etc) still evident after the various zonal forces were unified, officially at least, into one single army in July 1975. One of the Pol Pot group’s successes in their bid for total leadership was having control of the military’s political committee. This meant control of the political-military schools, from where the fanatical teenage war orphans with an unquestioned obedience to “Angkar” were trained, and then sent to replace the marked cadres in the various zones later purified by the Party. These schools were located in the Central and Southwest zones, I think, which was the powerbase of the Pol Pot group and where their allies, the likes of Ta Mok and Ke Pok, were situated.

Khmer rouge got their support from the poorest 20% of the peasantry. In my forthcoming post in Russian of course I write as horrible Dey Krahom slums were and shitter was located right in the hut. When the flood came all shit was flown around the houses. It was disgusting. It was enough for me to visit such a wretched place to completely change my values.

As for the comprehensive Vietnamese trouncing of the RAK, I’d hazard a guess (despite being equally ignorant of most military matters) that the fact that the Vietnamese had what were generally regarded as the finest ground troops on Earth at the time – experienced, disciplined, well-equipped etc etc – had a lot to do with it. I know that Son Sen and the other heads of the RAK also had a reputation for being dogmatically conventional commanders, which might explain the odd, inflexible tactic of just placing the best DK troops in the way of the Vietnamese guns.

One of the things I found most interesting about the PRK process of legitimisation is the way in which ‘good’ (i.e. dead) Khmer Rouge, like Hu Nim and Hou Yuon, were publicised as heroic socilaist dissidents. I think Hu Nim’s cell is still marked separately in the aforementioned ghoulish tourist attraction, unless I’ve got that confused with Koy Thuon.